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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











MIDDLESEX COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE; 
CHRISTOPHER KUBERIET; 
JENNIFER SESSA, individually and in her official capacity; 
BRUCE KAPLAN, in his official capacity 
____________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-03879) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jose L. Linares 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 12, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: November 2, 2012) 
_________ 
 








 On July 7, 2012, Leroy T. Moore, a state inmate confined at the Northern State 
Prison in Newark, New Jersey, filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey, alleging that the Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office, 
Middlesex County Prosecutor Bruce Kaplan, Assistant Prosecutor Christopher Kuberiet, 
and Prosecutor’s Agent Jennifer Sassa violated his civil rights in connection with his 
prosecution on multiple drug charges in state criminal court. 
Moore’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleged that Assistant Prosecutor Kuberiet 
violated his constitutional rights by continually deceiving the state criminal court by 
stating that Moore was in possession of “several grams of dope” when he was arrested in 
2009 and withholding exculpatory lab reports from both the court and Moore’s defense 
counsel showing that the actual weight of the drugs Moore was in possession of at the 
time of his arrest was less than one gram.  The complaint further alleged that Prosecutor’s 
Agent Sassa conspired with Kuberiet to withhold exculpatory evidence by forwarding a 
discovery packet to Moore’s lawyer without including the exculpatory “lab reports as to 
the CDS & amount.”  County Prosecutor Bruce Kaplan was named as a defendant for 
failing to adequately train and supervise Kuberiet and Sassa.  Moore’s complaint sought 
an unspecified amount of compensatory and punitive monetary damages. 
On May 10, 2012, the District Court granted Moore leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis but then sua sponte dismissed his complaint with prejudice as against all 
defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and 1915A(b)(2).  In an opinion 
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accompanying the order of dismissal, the District Court explained that Moore’s complaint 
must be dismissed because prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from claims based on 
their failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, provided that they did so while functioning 
in a prosecutorial capacity, and that Moore’s complaint did not contain allegations with 
respect to willful destruction or other aggravating circumstances sufficient to pierce the 
defendants’ absolute prosecutorial immunity.  Moore timely filed this appeal. 
We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, given the District 
Court’s dismissal of Moore’s complaint with prejudice.  See Borelli v. City of Reading
State prosecutors are afforded absolute immunity from civil suit under § 1983 for 
the initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecutions.  
, 
532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976).   
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 
431 (1976).  Prosecutors also enjoy absolutely immunity for actions undertaken in 
preparation for judicial proceedings or for trial, provided those actions occur in the course 
of their role as a prosecutor.  Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).  
Although a prosecutor’s deliberate destruction of exculpatory evidence is not entitled to 
absolute immunity, the decision to withhold such evidence from the defense while 
functioning as an advocate for the state is protected by absolute immunity.  Imbler, 424 
U.S. at 431-32 n.34; Yarris v. Cnty. of Delaware
Supervisory prosecutors are absolutely immune both from suits for acts 
undertaken in relation to an individual trial, and from suits charging that they failed to 
provide adequate training and supervision.  
, 465 F.3d 129, 137 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 
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346-49 (2009).  The employee of an attorney, including the employee or agent of a 
prosecutor, is also granted absolute immunity from § 1983 suits where the function of the 
employee and the judicial process are closely allied.  Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 
206 (3d Cir. 1975).  This Court has held, for example, that absolute immunity extends to 
employees of prosecutors who perform investigative work in furtherance of a criminal 
prosecution.  Davis v. Grusemeyer
We agree with the District Court that Moore’s complaint seeks monetary relief 
from defendants who are absolutely immune from suit under § 1983, and that dismissal 
under sections 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and 1915A(b)(2) was therefore proper.  Moore sought 
money damages from a prosecutor, his supervisor, and his agent, each of whom is 
immune from such relief under settled law.  Moreover, we detect no abuse of discretion 
in the District Court’s decision to dismiss the complaint without offering leave to amend.  
, 996 F.2d 617, 631-32 (3d Cir. 1993). 
See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110-11 (3d Cir. 2002).  For all of 
these reasons, we will therefore summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
